Comments on: Animal experimentation and medical research: In conversation with Colin Blakemore

By: blog.talkingphilosophy.com » In defense of animal experimentation

blog.talkingphilosophy.com » In defense of animal experimentation — Wed, 06 May 2009 01:11:43 +0000

[...] Since there has been some discussion on here about animal rights, etc., I thought people might be interested in a conversation I had with Professor Colin Blakemore (formerly head of the Medical Research Council in the UK), where he defends animal experimentation and speciesism. It’s extracted from my book, “What Scientists Think”, and you can find it here. [...]

By: Jonathan

Jonathan — Thu, 23 Apr 2009 19:10:19 +0000

I suppose i ought to declare an interest having worked for a major Pharmaceutical firm and also had a vivi sectionist as a partner for five years. I was not a vivi sectionist myself and my partner called herself a Pharmacologist. My recollections of her was of someone who cared about animals and also someone who was passionate about her research and its consequences. I open with this as the general smear of unnecessary infliction of pain is the box into which all who use animals in research are placed. This is supposed to follow from the supposed failure of all animal experimentation, something which Colin Blakemore clearly addresses.
The idea that animals in experimental situations are subject to pain is again an ignorance of the experimental situation and was certainly not my experience and the care of the animals was something which my partner and I talked long and hard about.
It cannnot be one of the prime rights of animals to live their lives without interference, partly because many are simply vermin.Are we seriously to allow mice and rats to infest our dwellings, eat our food, and spread disease, whilst we move out into the fields? I respect my neighbours right to inhabit his or her dwelling and eat their own food, mice and rats do not (neither do other so called sentient creatures). Rules of social engagement do not apply to animals as they do to us. There are of course analogies in respect of social organisation, especially in primates, but we don’t form social contracts with rats, nor they with us.That difference does not answer the elusive question of sentience, but I cannot speak mouse, or rat or insect or bacteria. We can however notice the differences in structure between these creatures andf behaviours and possible experience. If we go along supposing sentience without structure we start some form of dualism where any entity can have a self, even a jelly fish. I once kept (unsuccessfully) Starfish (Asterias Rubens). They died and I wondered what they felt, I never found out.
Finally ( would like to make a bit of a comment about what I see as a a curious attempt at pay offs in some of the replies on “vivisection”. Cat versus daughter, obviously daughter, but not a mass murderer. But this has nothing to do with the results of animal experimental the objectives of which are (in general), human well-being. The pay offs are open ended, from insulin to antibiotics to immunisation and eventual cures for aids cancers and whatever. Long after the animals have died and in doing so have contributed (in the long run),to the amelioration or control of these and many other conditions. The benefactors are the many generations of people and animals also (something which gets forgotten), who follow on.

By: Sidney Gendin

Sidney Gendin — Wed, 22 Apr 2009 19:20:27 +0000

The discussion whether animal experimentation is necessary for the advancement of human life is jumping the gun, whichever side one comes down on. Even if X is necessary for Y, the prior question is whether Y is necessary. Worse, it may be that Y is not even desirable, much less necessary, and, if so, that cuts short inquiry into whether X is necessary for it.

While human death and suffering are undesirable so long as survivors remain, I don’t know any argument that shows the undesirability of the easy, painless end to sentient life. In short, what is wrong with negative utilitarianism? Damned if I know.

By: Owen

Owen — Wed, 22 Apr 2009 19:00:22 +0000

Jeremy: “Okay, so let’s consider the jellyfish, for example.”

That’s all very interesting, but since I’m not one of those extreme Buddhists, I don’t feel the need to defend the ethical equivalence of all species .

I was disputing the claim that “no animal is more significant than any human”, not “all animals are as significant as all humans”.

By: Michael Ellyett

Michael Ellyett — Wed, 22 Apr 2009 02:16:33 +0000

Its absurd that to suggest other animals are not self-aware and self-conscious, or are fundamentally of a different category? These people seem to want to argue that animals are like people (which to me is like saying salmon and like fish) – and at the same time saying they are not like people (when it comes to rights)?

The moral argument in favour of the use of animals must be similiar to that which other sacrifices we make (or would make. Some lives are scarificed in a war for the benefit or many. Most people would agree, if pressed, to the death of a 90 year old, instead of the death of a 9 year old – or the death of a chronically and terminally ill old person in favour of the death of healthy young person.

The death of one soldier to save 100 people – yes. The death of 10 soldiers to save 1 person – No. The death of 100 Chimpazees for one 1 person – maybe. The death of 10,000 Chimps for 1 person – doesn’t sound right to me. There are good and bad Chimps. How many good Chimps would we sacrifice to save Hitler?

And why wax on about AIDS – which is a disease often directly associated with a discretionary act. Why not focus on Malaria. Obviously their are innocent victums in both cases – but in one case the victums are almost universally innocent.

Why do we have primary obligation to our own species? This isn’t a moral argument. One could historically make the same claim about race, religion and ethnicity. And watching USA reaction to deaths in Iraq I get the feeling many still do. The USA seems to think it is OK for a hundred Non-Americans to die – to save 1 American life.

Clearly lines need to be drawn. The question isn’t animal research – or no animal research. The question isn’t do we ever sacrifice a life. The question is under what circumstances and where the line are drawn and why

By: Michael Ellyett

Michael Ellyett — Wed, 22 Apr 2009 02:12:10 +0000

I find it absurd that some human have the arrogance to suggest other animals are not self-aware and self-conscious. Or are fundamentally of a different category? What is the basis of the assertion? These people seem to want to argue that animals are like people (which to me is like saying salmon and like fish) – and at the same time saying they are not like people (when it comes to rights)?

The moral argument in favour of the use of animals must be similiar to that which other sacrifices we make (or would make) are considered. A small number of lives scarificed in a war for the benefit or many. Or the sacrifice most people would agree to, if pressed, to the death of a 90 year old, instead of the death of a 9 year old. Or the death of a chronically and terminally ill old person in favour of the death of healthy young person.

The death of one soldier to save 10, 100, 1000 people – yes. The death of 10 soldiers to save 1 person – No. The death of 100 Chimpazees for one 1 person – maybe. The death of 10,000 Chimps for 1 person – doesn’t sound right to me.

Let us assume there are good Chimps and bad Chimps. Based on my experience with animals this is clearly the case. How many good Chimps would we sacrifice to save Hitler?

And whay wax on about AIDS – which as we know is a disease directly associated with a discretionary act. Why not focus on Malaria. Obviously their are innocent victums in both cases – but in one case the victums are almost universally innocent – in the other case this is far from true.

By: Jeremy Stangroom

Jeremy Stangroom — Tue, 21 Apr 2009 20:54:04 +0000

There is an irony about Jainism, which is that despite its commitment to non-violence, it’s kind of massively egocentric, focussing on a personal, spiritual quest: there is no injunction to alms giving, for example, as one finds in Islam and Sikhism.

Also, according to tradition, at the start of his spiritual quest, Mahavira – the founder of the religion – just upped sticks, abandoned his wife, children and family, and then later ignored his wife when she attempted to interrupt a period of penance!

By: Chris Miller

Chris Miller — Tue, 21 Apr 2009 19:46:21 +0000

“an extreme version of Buddhism”

I think Colin Blakemore may have Jainism in mind – it adheres strictly to Ahimsa, non-violence towards all living creatures. It predates Buddhism, on which it was an influence.

Modern understanding of microscopic organisms renders a strict adherence to this principle impossible – a line must be drawn somewhere between chimps and viruses.

By: Jeremy Stangroom

Jeremy Stangroom — Tue, 21 Apr 2009 19:38:22 +0000

Well it’s not justified *just* because it works, though the fact that it works would have to be part of the moral calculus.

In other words, the fact that animal experimentation works is a necessary condition of it being moral, but not a sufficient condition. It’s not permissible in the case of humans because we make the judgement that the suffering of humans is morally more significant than that of animals.

This is not an aribtrary judgement. See my jellyfish thing about.

By: Jolanta Benal

Jolanta Benal — Tue, 21 Apr 2009 19:35:16 +0000

If animal experimentation is justified because it works, why aren’t we performing these experiments on humans, who presumably provide the ideal model? I just don’t see any way around the conclusion that we experiment on animals not because it’s ethically acceptable but because we can. Might makes right.